Note that these events may be logged only once during a session after a restart if the Enforcement mode registry setting is changed. This event is logged when an non-updated EFS client that does not support packet level privacy attempts to connect to an EFS server that has installed the December 14, , or a later Windows update. Need more help? Expand your skills. Get new features first. Was this information helpful? Yes No. Thank you! Any more feedback?
The more you tell us the more we can help. Can you help us improve? Resolved my issue. Clear instructions. Easy to follow. No jargon. CVE addresses a security bypass vulnerability that affects the Kerberos Privilege Attribute Certificate PAC and allows potential attackers to impersonate domain controllers. To exploit this vulnerability, a compromised domain account might cause the Key Distribution Center KDC to create a service ticket with a higher privilege level than that of the compromised account.
It accomplishes this by preventing the KDC from identifying which account the higher privilege service ticket is for. Later, when a Kerberos service ticket is generated for an account, the new authentication process will verify that the account that requested the TGT is the same account referenced in the service ticket. Update all devices that host the Active Directory domain controller role by installing the November 9, update.
After the November 9, update has been installed on all Active Directory domain controllers for at least 7 days, we strongly suggest that you enable Enforcement mode on all Active Directory domain controllers. Starting with the July 12, Enforcement Phase update, Enforcement mode will be enabled on all Windows domain controllers and will be required. Initial deployment — Introduction of the update, as well as the PacRequestorEnforcement registry key. Second deployment — Removal of PacRequestorEnforcement value of 0 ability to disable the registry key.
Enforcement phase — Enforcement mode is enabled. Removal of PacRequestorEnforcement registry key. The initial deployment phase starts with the Windows update released on November 9, This release:. Adds support for the PacRequestorEnforcement registry value, which allows you to transition to the Enforcement phase early.
Mitigation consists of the installation of Windows updates on all devices that host the domain controller role and read-only domain controllers RODCs. The second deployment phase starts with the Windows update released on April 12, This phase removes the PacRequestorEnforcement setting of 0. Setting PacRequestorEnforcement to 0 after this update is installed will have the same effect as setting PacRequestorEnforcement to 1.
The domain controllers DCs will be in Deployment mode. Note This phase is not necessary if PacRequestorEnforcement was never set to 0 in your environment. This phase helps ensure that customers that set PacRequestorEnforcement to 0move to setting 1 before the Enforcement phase. Note This update assumes that all domain controllers are updated with the November 9, or later Windows update.
The July 12, release will transition all Active Directory domain controllers into the Enforcement phase. The Enforcement phase will also remove the PacRequestorEnforcement registry key completely.
As a result, Windows domain controllers that have installed the July 12, update will no longer be compatible with:. Domain controllers that installed the November 9, or later updates but have not yet installed the April 12, update ANDwho have a PacRequestorEnforcement registry value of 0. When you understand the requirements for your deployment, you can set about gathering the needed resources, importing them into ConfigMgr, and performing any necessary ConfigMgr configuration or hierarchy modification to meet those requirements.
Necessary resources include OS source media, application source files, drivers, configuration scripts, test systems, and storage space.
Many of these resources including the OS source files, drivers, and applications must be imported into ConfigMgr for use in OSD-the import of both OS source files and drivers is covered in the "Operating System Installers" and "Drivers" sections of this tutorial.
Based upon the physical nature of your organization, you may need to add site systems. For example, smaller sites that normally would not require a site system for normal ConfigMgr operations such as inventory and software distribution may need to have one added to support PXE, the larger OS image files used by OSD, or the transient storage of user data. Alternatively, site systems may already exist at these locations and simply need these roles enabled-the "Site System Roles" section discusses the two supplementary OSD roles and installing them.
The core of the OSD process is putting all the requirements in place to deploy Windows. It involves stringing the various OSD building blocks see the "OSD Building Blocks" section for complete details into an ordered structure that meets your defined requirements. This is often an iterative process, involving building a basic structure, testing, adding to the basic structure, testing again, and so on. As requirements change or are revealed , the iterative process will continue even after you implement OSD into production.
This self-explanatory step is often over-looked and rarely given the time or attention that it deserves. So many different permutations and factors exist even in smaller and simpler environments that you can probably never test all of them; however, not properly and thoroughly testing as many as you can will result in poor results and lost data.
In general, you should test against every scenario and model of hardware possible in your organization. Much like a proper software development lifecycle, testing should account for most of your time when developing new task sequences.
Although much of this time is watching progress bars, you will never actually know if your design work will result in the wanted outcome of a properly deployed Windows instance without it.
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